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With the development and evolution of fourth and fifth amendment rights in recent years has come an increased scrutiny of each
step in the criminal process. Actions of law enforcement officers have
been regarded with special interest, probably because such actions
are most likely to threaten individual rights. This article examines two
recent decisions pertaining to the elements and effects of the arrest
or detention of a suspect. The author presents an in-depth analysis of
the opinions, injects his own perceptions of the law in the area, and
comes to some conclusions about the procedural and substantive effects
of the decisions on the law of arrest in Wyoming.

FITZGERALD V. STATE,
DUNAWAY V. NEW YORK AND
THE LAW OF ARREST IN WYOMING
by Richard Scott Rideout*
In the summer of 1979, the United States Supreme
Court decided the case of Dunaway v. New York.1 Approximately five months later, on October 30, 1979, the Wyoming Supreme Court handed down its decision in Fitzgerald
v. State.2 The cases involved very similar fact patterns, yet
were decided on very different theories. The purpose of
this article is to attempt to explain those decisions and how
they affected the law of arrest, substantively and procedurally, in the State of Wyoming.
The Law of Arrest in Wyoming Prior to Fitzgerald and
Dunaway.
Prior to the decisions of Dunaway and Fitzgerald, the
law of arrest in Wyoming appeared to conform to generally
Copyright@ 1980 by the University of Wyoming
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accepted concepts. The leading case was Rodarte v. City of
Riverton.' Rodarte was a civil case, however, and could
appropriately be limited. But, whether in dicta or not,
Rodarte set forth an extensive discourse on the law of arrest
in Wyoming, including a definition of what circumstances
would constitute an arrest. After a brief discussion of the
facts of the case, the opinion set forth its definition:
Excepting only where the officer temporarily detains for investigation, for an arrest to take place
the officer need only subject the person he confronts
to some kind of control and detention amounting
to a restriction upon his or her freedom. He arrests
when he, with the present ability to do so, exerts
his will upon the citizen in a way which indicates
an intention to detain him or to take him into
custody-he arrests him when he issues an order
in a way which causes the subject to believe he
must obey the command which, if obeyed, results
in a restriction upon freedom. The officer arrests
when, in order to detain, he touches his subject or
lays hands on him.
Any laying on of hands or any detention coupled
with an act or attitude indicating the officer's
apparent intention to assume physical control or to
take the subject into custody is also an arrest.4
It would appear that this definition accords with the
almost universal rules of arrest. Actions that "deprive a
person of his liberty by legal authority" constitute an
arrest.' There were exceptions to this definition, however,
which are important to the understanding of Fitzgerald
and particularly Dunaway. LaFave, in his treatise on the
fourth amendment, cites two "extremely important propositions" that he believes emerged from Terry v. Ohio:
first, that a seizure need not be called an arrest in order
that it be subject to the requirements of the fourth amend3. 552 P.2d 1245 (Wyo. 1976).
4. Id. at 1251.
5. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ; Rodarte v. City of Riverton, supra note 3;
Raigosa v. State, 562 P.2d 1009, 1012 (Wyo. 1977) ("a detention of personal
liberty"); Bee generally, 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 215 (1978).
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ment; and second, that a "seizure" that is limited in its
intrusiveness may be reasonable under the fourth amendment even in the absence of the requirement of probable
6
cause that is traditionally required for a legal arrest.
Dunaway v. New York focuses on the second point. It appears that the Court in Rodarte also accepted this proposition.7 It was against this background that the United States
Supreme Court decided Dunaway v. New York, and the
Wyoming Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Fitzgerald v. State.
Dunaway v. New York.
Dunaway v. New York decided a question reserved ten
years earlier in Morales v. New York,' whether "custodial
questioning on less than probable cause for a full-fledged
arrest" violated the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution.' The United States Supreme Court, in an
6.

LAFAvE,

supra note 5, at 216.

7. Terry v. Ohio, supra note 5, sets forth the well known "stop and frisk"
rule as an exception to the general fourth amendment rules. The Terry
decision, however, did not create the only existing exception to such law.
It had been decided, prior to Dunaway and Fitzgerald, that a brief detention
for investigation or questioning did not constitute an unreasonable seizure.
People v. Morales, 42 N.Y.2d 129, 366 N.E.2d 248, 397 N.Y.S.2d 587
(1977); People v. Dunaway. 61 A.D.2d 299, 402 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1978).
Indeed, this author believes Rodarte, despite the disclaimer made in Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 1017, expressly recognized that exception. At 1251,
the Rodarte majority, in defining an arrest, specifically stated: "Excepting
(emonly where the officer temporarily detains for investigation, . ."
phasis added) and then continued with the definition noted above. Later,
also at 1251, the opinion goes on to state:
This does not mean that a person may not be detained by the officer
for investigation without an arrest being effected where there is
probable cause to believe there has been a crime committed or to
believe one is being committed, coupled with a belief that the
subject is or could be involved in its commission. Under such
probable2 cause circumstances the person may be detained for
inquiry.
Footnote 2 cites United States v. Sanchez, 450 F.2d 525, (10th Cir. 1971);
Terry v. Ohio, supra note 5; Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, (9th Cir.
1966) ; United States v. Unverzagt, 424 F.2d 396, (8th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Oswald, 441 F.2d 44, (9th Cir. 1971); and United States v.
Harflinger, 436 F.2d 928, (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973
(1971), all of which, in this author's opinion, were overruled by Dunaway,
or are factually distinguishable as involving automobile or border situations,
and which authorized a temporary detention for questioning on less than
probable cause to arrest.
8. 396 U.S. 102 (1969).
9. Dunaway v. New York, supra note 1, at 202. Dunaway v. New York and
People v. Morales have had similar histories and have traveled a long
route to reach final disposition. Dunaway, after conviction at trial, appealed,
and both the Appellate Division of the Fourth Department and the New
York Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. People v. Dunaway, 42
A.D.2d 689, 346 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1973), ajf'd, 35 N.Y.2d 741, 320 N.E.2d
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opinion by Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart,
White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, held such conduct
to be violative of the fourth amendment.
After questioning an inmate in a local jail, police
received information that Irving Jerome Dunaway may
have been involved in an attempted robbery and a homicide.
It was admitted that the information in the possession of
the police did not constitute sufficient probable cause to
arrest Dunaway or to obtain a warrant. The patrolmen,
however, were ordered to "pick up" Dunaway and "bring
him in." Dunaway was taken into custody and although not
physically restrained or told he was under arrest, would
have been so restrained if he had resisted. After having
been given his Miranda warnings, Dunaway waived counsel
and made an incriminating statement. He also drew sketches
that implicated him in the crime. Dunaway was questioned
again the following day and made additional statements.
646, 361 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1974). The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). Dunaway v.
New York, 422 U.S. 1053 (1975). The New York Court of Appeals directed
the Monroe County Court to make further factual findings on the issue of
whether Dunaway had been detained, whether probable cause existed for
the detention, and, in the event there was a detention without probable
cause, whether the statements made should have been suppressed as having
been the product of an illegal arrest as Brown required. People v. Dunaway,
38 N.Y.2d 812, 345 N.E.2d 583, 382 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1975). The county court
then determined that the motion to suppress should have been granted, as
the arrest was illegal and the statements had been the product of that
illegal arrest. The appellate division, however, reversed, People v. Dunaway,
supra note 7, on the strength of People v. Morales, supra note 7, and a
finding that Brown was inapplicable. The New York Court of Appeals
dismissed an application for leave to appeal, but on petition to the United
States Supreme Court, certiorari was granted. Dunaway v. New York,
439 U.S. 979 (1978).
People v. Morales. After conviction at trial, both the appellate division,
27 A.D.2d 904, 280 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1967), and the court of appeals, 22
N.Y.2d 55, 238 N.E.2d 307, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1968), affirmed. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari, Morales v. New York, 394 U.S.
972 (1969) and, after a short per curiam opinion, remanded the case for
further findings in light of Brown v. Illinois, supra. Morales v. New York,
supra note 8. The New York Court of Appeals so directed, 26 N.Y.2d 844,
258 N.E.2d 90, 309 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1970). Again, both the appellate division
and the court of appeals affirmed, People v. Morales, 52 A.D.2d 818, 383
N.Y.S.2d 608 (1976), aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 129, 366 N.E.2d 248, 397 N.Y.S.2d
587 (1977), the latter case specifically holding:
Law enforcement officials may detain an individual upon reasonable suspicion for questioning for a reasonable and brief period
of time under carefully controlled conditions which are ample to
protect the individual's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
People v. Morales, supra, at 135; 251; 590. Brown v. Illinois, supra, was
distinguished, since here the detention was found to be something less than
an illegal arrest. Finally, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari,
Morales v. New York. 434 U.S. 1018 (1978).
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At trial, the defense moved to suppress the statements
and the sketches, but the motions were denied. Dunaway
was then tried and convicted. On appeal, the conviction was
affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment and remanded the case for
further findings in light of Brown v. Illinois.1° The trial
court, after hearing, granted the motions to suppress, but
the decision was reversed by the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court on the basis of People v. Morales,"
despite the specific finding by the trial court that Dunaway
did not voluntarily accompany the police to the station
house. The New York Court of Appeals denied certiorari,
but Dunaway's petition was again granted by United States
Supreme Court. 2
The majority opinion held that Dunaway had been
seized when he was taken involuntarily to the police station,
citing Terry v. Ohio."5 The majority held that as a general
rule, such seizures are reasonable only if supported by
probable cause, unless one of several narrowly drawn exceptions applies. The court then proceeded to distinguish
Terry and its progeny as being inapplicable and concluded
that since probable cause was lacking, the seizure was unreasonable and violative of the fourth amendment. Terry
was a departure from traditional fourth amendment analysis
in that it defined a special category of fourth amendment
seizures that were substantially less intrusive than arrests.
In such cases, the general rule requiring probable cause
could be replaced by a balancing test that weighed the
intrusiveness of the seizure against the necessity for the
police action. The application of that test led the Court to
fashion a "narrowly defined" seizure on less than probable
cause. The Court has been careful to confine this rule to a
narrow scope such as frisks for weapons, 4 or border patrol
checks." These cases did not apply the traditional rule only
Supra note 9.
Supra note 7.
Supra note 9.
Supra note 5.
See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) ; Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U.S. 106 (1977).
15. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) ; United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
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because they involved conduct that "fell far short of the
kind of intrusion associated with an arrest."1 In this case,
the intrusion was substantial and in "important respects
indistinguishable from a traditional arrest."17 The majority
stated that "any 'exception' that could cover a seizure as
intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow the
general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause.""
It was then necessary to make an analysis of the case
in light of Brown v. Illinois." The court concluded that the
nexus between the unconstitutional police conduct and the
incriminating statements and sketches that had been obtained as a result of the arrest were not sufficiently
attenuated to allow their use at trial. Although proper
Miranda warnings had been given and the statements may
have been voluntary for purposes of the fifth amendment,
the exclusionary rule, when considered in light of the fourth
amendment as well as the fifth, requires further analysis
so that the distinct rights and policies protected by the
fourth amendment can be enforced. Therefore, a determination that the statements were voluntary is merely a threshold requirement for the purposes of this analysis. The
fourth amendment focuses on the "causal connection between
the illegality and the confession.""0 The courts must determine whether the statements were obtained by exploitation
of the illegal arrest. If such statements were the product
of the illegal arrest, they must be suppressed or the purpose of the exclusionary rule would be frustrated, as the
police could flagrantly violate the fourth amendment with
impunity and without sanction. Several factors are to be
considered in this analysis: (1) the "temporal proximity of
the arrest and the confession;" (2) the "presence of intervening circumstances"; and (3) "particularly, the purpose
and flagrancy of the official misconduct."'" The burden of
showing admissibility rests on the prosecution.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Dunaway v. New York, supra note 1, at 212.
Id.
Id. at 213.
Supra note 9.
Brown v. Illinois, supra note 9, at 603.
Id. at 603, 604.
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In this case, the Court concluded that the statements
and sketches had been obtained by exploiting the illegal
arrest. The Court noted the similarity between this case
and Brown-here the police seized Dunaway, without probable cause in the hope that something might turn up, and
Dunaway then confessed without any significant intervening event. The first statement was made within an hour
after his arrest; a second more complete statement was
made on the following day. The majority concluded that
to admit the statements and sketches in this case would
permit a flagrant violation of the fourth amendment while
allowing admission of evidence obtained by exploitation of
that illegality. Such a result would encourage unconstitutional police conduct and make the courts a party to that
illegality.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice, dissented.
The major contention of the dissent was that the case did
not involve a seizure: "In my view, this is a case where the
defendant voluntarily accompanied the police to the station
to answer their questions."2 The dissent saw nothing unconstitutional about such volitional cooperation. After reciting the facts that he believed supported a finding that no
seizure occurred, and noting the apparent confusion in the
decisions below, Justice Rehnquist remarked that while it
may be true that "a police request to come to the station
may indeed be an 'awesome experience' ", it does not mean
"that in every instance where a person assents to a police
request to come to headquarters, there has been a 'seizure'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.""5 The dissenters found that Dunaway acted voluntarily and, hence,
no seizure resulted and the statements should have been admissible. 4 The majority relied on the determination, made
22. Dunaway v. New York, supra note 1, at 222 (dissenting opinion).
23. Id. at 224 (dissenting opinion).
24. The dispute between the majority and the dissent on this issue was similar
to the split between the majority and the dissent in Fitzgerald v. State,
supra note,2, although not identical. Since the majority opinion in Dunaway
based its holding on the Morales issue, the case would not be dispositive of
Fitzgerald. The dispute :-does point out the importance of clear factual
determinations and the need for counsel to have the rulings below specifically reflected in the record. Not only will such a decision govern the
trial, but it may determine the scope of the issue and the result on appeal
of a conviction. This author would agree with Justice Rehnquist, and the
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by the trial court, that this case did not involve a situation
where the defendant voluntarily appeared at police headquarters in response to a request of the police.25 Justice
Rehnquist, however, objectively reviewed the record and
made his own determination of the issue, and from that
review, concluded the defendant had acted voluntarily."
After reaching this conclusion, the dissent continued,
however, and argued that despite a finding that Dunaway
had been seized, the sketches and statements need not have
been suppressed under Brown v. Illinois." Justice Rehnquist
would have held that any connection, or taint, that resulted
from the allegedly illegal arrest was sufficiently attenuated
to permit use of the evidence at trial. He pointed out that
Brown listed several factors that should be considered in
the determination of whether "inculpatory statements were
sufficiently a product of free will to be admissible under
the Fourth Amendment." Justice Rehnquist listed these
factors as follows: (1) voluntariness of the statements as
a "threshold requirement"; (2) the giving of Miranda warnings-"an important factor". Also relevant are: (3) the
"temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession,";
(4) "the presence of intervening circumstances," ; and
(5) "the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.""8
Justice Rehnquist would have held that given the
deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule, factor five,
listed above, was the most important in the consideration of
the question. Where the police had acted in "good faith"

25.
26.

27.
28.

majority in Fitzgerald, that there is nothing improper or unconstitutional
if a suspect voluntarily cooperates with the police in an investigation,
even if he thereby incriminates himself. See, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent to search). The real question is how can we
determine whether those acts were in fact volitional, for the fate of the
defendant may well rest on the resolution of that issue.
Dunaway v. New York, supra note 1, at 223-24 (dissenting opinion).
In this regard, Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Dunaway, would probably agree with Justice McClintock, in his dissent in Fitzgerald, as to the
scope of the duty of an appellate court to independently review the record
below to determine a constitutional issue.
Supra note 9.
Dunaway v. New York, supra note 1, at 226 (dissenting opinion), quoting
Brown v. Illinois, supra note 9, at 603, 604.
Note the possible effect of such an analysis, for example, on the trial
court's ruling in Fitzgerald and the majority's implicit finding of voluntariness for purposes of the fourth amendment.
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and not in a flagrantly illegal manner, the dissent would
require no more than proper Miranda warnings and a determination that the statements were voluntary for purposes
of the fifth amendment.29 In regard to the other factors,
the majority conceded that Dunaway received proper
Miranda warnings, that his statements were voluntary,
and that the police acted in good faith. The record was
clear that the police had never threatened or abused
Dunaway and their conduct could in no manner be considered flagrant. One statement was given voluntarily about
an hour after petitioner arrived at the station; the other
statement was given the following day. Thus, the dissent
would have found that the statements and sketches were
sufficiently purged of the primary taint of the alleged
illegal detention.
This author agrees with the majority in Dunaway that
the concept of temporary detention for interrogation, or
investigation, is clearly a seizure for purposes of the fourth
amendment. Terry v. Ohio seemed to have resolved that
issue."0 Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, would also have
agreed. 1 The majority and dissenting opinions in Dunaway
disagreed on whether the petitioner had voluntarily cooperated with the police.
Fitzgerald v. State.
On October 30, 1979, the Supreme Court of Wyoming
handed down the decision of Fitzgerald v. State, 2 affirming
the conviction of the appellant for murder in the seconddegree. Three issues were raised on appeal, but only the
first, whether the trial court erred in not suppressing state29. Although beyond the scope of this article, it is interesting to note the
emphasis placed on the supposed deterrent effect on police misconduct as
a justification for the exclusionary rule. Both the majority and the dissent
note this point. This position has been questioned by several constitutional
scholars as being a misinterpretation of the origin of the rule. See,
Kamisar, A Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 15 CRIM. L. B. 5 (1979),
who makes a valid argument that if such a deterrent effect is the underlying basis for the exclusionary rules, critics could validly and forcefully
attack the rule by, for example, statistical evidence that police conduct
was not in fact deterred, and hence, the rule, which excludes otherwise
probative evidence, should be judicially eliminated.
30. See also, Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
31. Dunaway v. New York, supra note 1, at 222 (dissenting opinion).
32. Supra, note 2.
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ments made by Fitzgerald that the appellant contends were
the product of an illegal arrest, is relevant for purposes of
this article.
After the body of the victim was found on September
22, 1977, police learned that the deceased had last been seen
leaving a local tavern with two young men not residents of
the area. Further investigation, with the assistance of
composite drawings, led the police to suspect that Fitzgerald
may have been involved, or that he may have information
relating to the crime. On September 27th, the police approached Fitzgerald while he and a friend were having
dinner at a restaurant. Four policemen were involved
in the confrontation and at least two were inside the
building.
The police asked Fitzgerald if he would talk to them
about the incident at the station headquarters and he apparently agreed. He asked if he could finish dinner first,
but was told the police would prefer that he accompany
them now and that they would buy him dinner after their
talk. Fitzgerald was not told he was under arrest at that
time. During the ride to the station house, in response to
his question, he was informed by one of the policemen that
he had not been arrested. At the station house, Fitzgerald
was read his Miranda rights and after questioning made
several incriminating statements implicating himself in the
crime. The State conceded that at the time the police approached Fitzgerald they did not have probable cause to
arrest him or to obtain a warrant.
A motion was made before trial to suppress the statements as having been involuntary and as having been made
as the result of an illegal search and seizure of the appellant.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, but made no
specific finding on the question of whether Fitzgerald had
in fact been arrested. The trial court simply ruled that the
statements should not be suppressed. Fitzgerald did not
testify at the suppression hearing. The officers, however,
stated that the appellant voluntarily agreed to accompany
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss2/7
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the police to the station to answer questions concerning the
matter. Fitzgerald, they testified, had been very cooperative.
On appeal, Fitzgerald contended that the statements were
the fruit of an illegal arrest.
The majority initially cited Dunaway, but dismissed
it as having no bearing on the case. Justice Rose, for the
majority, believed Dunaway had been "foreshadowed" by
Rodarte v. City of Riverton." The majority stated that the
law was clear: "If Fitzgerald was taken involuntarily to
the Buffalo police station then he had a right, under the
facts of this case, to have the statements suppressed despite
adequate Miranda warnings."34 The issue for the majority
was whether the record supported a finding that Fitzgerald
went voluntarily with the police to the station house, for
the trial court must have found, when it denied the motion
to suppress, that the defendant did in fact 35leave the restaurant with the police of his "own free will.))
Preliminary to the discussion, the court made several
observations: (1) that Fitzgerald did not testify at the
suppression hearings; (2) that the issue whether Fitzgerald
voluntarily accompanied the police would be resolved by the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard; and (3) under
appellate rules of review, the evidence would be viewed
most favorably to the party who prevailed below." The
majority then recited the evidence and found that the trial
court could "reasonably conclude" that Fitzgerald did in
fact voluntarily cooperate with the police, and found no
33. Supra, note 3. This author respectfully disagrees with the conclusion. See
note 7, supra. In this regard, compare Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Dunaway v. New York, supra note 1, at 221, where he states that if the
issue were simply one of deciding the "question of the legality of custodial
questioning on less than probable cause for a full fledged arrest" that he
would not hesitate to join the majority. Apparently, Justice Rehnquist
would have had no problem in finding such "custodial interrogation" a
seizure. He believed, however, the record in Dunaway showed the petitioner
voluntarily accompanied the police, and hence, it was improper to decide
that issue. There seems no doubt, however, that the majority in Dunaway
did not hold that voluntary cooperation with the police would trigger the
constitutional protections of the fourth amendment. In this respect, this
author also disagrees with Mr. Justice McClintock that Dunaway is
dispositive of the Fitzgerald decision.
34. Fitzgerald v. State, supra note 2, at 1017, 1018.
35. This author cannot agree, as an implicit finding of voluntariness from such
a ruling ignores the Brown decision.
36. Discussion on issues 2 and 3 will occur infra.
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reason to disturb the trial court's implicit finding that the
appellant acted in a voluntary manner. Dunaway, it was
stated, did not require, on the facts of this case, a finding
of involuntariness as a matter of law." Childs v. State,"'
decided after Dunaway, seemed more in point to the
majority and indicated that voluntary cooperation could not
be equated with an arrest. As no arrest occurred, the trial
court did not err in failing to suppress the subsequent
statements on the basis of their having been obtained as
the result of an illegal arrest.
A sharp dissent was registered by Mr. Justice McClintock, who focused primarily on the issue of whether
the appellant voluntarily accompanied the police. Initially,
Justice McClintock argued Dunaway was "most pertinent"
to the determination of the case and remarked that the
factual settings were virtually identical." While Dunaway
was factually very close to Fitzgerald, the issues decided
in the two cases were quite distinct. Fitzgerald involved the
issue of voluntariness for purposes of the fourth amendment-whether the appellant voluntarily accompanied the
police to the station. If in fact he did, no arrest occurred.
The majority in Dunaway would most likely agree, for
despite Justice Rehnquist's concern, nothing in the Dunaway opinion even suggested that voluntary cooperation
should trigger fourth amendment protections. Indeed, the
majority noted that the specific issue was whether "custodial questioning on less than probable cause for a full-fledged
arrest" violated the fourth amendment." The majority cited
the trial court's specific finding that the case "does not
involve a situation where the defendant voluntarily appeared at police headquarters in response to a request of
the police." 41 In this light, Justice Brennan had no trouble
deciding that such a detention for custodial interrogation
was a seizure, and an unreasonable seizure, prohibited by
the fourth amendment unless based on probable cause.
37. Fitzgerald v. State, supra note 2, at 1019.
38. 584 S.W.2d 783 (Tenn. 1979).
39. Fitzgerald v. State, supra note 2, at 1023 (dissenting opinion).
40. Dunaway v. New York, supra note 1, at 202.
41. Id. at 205.
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In order to understand this concept, and to put Dunaway in proper context, it is necessary to review the decision
below and the case of People v. Morales.42 The origin of the
concept of "detention for custodial interrogation" or "investigatory detention" on less than probable cause was in
some ways similar to the rationale of Terry v. Ohio. Such
an act was viewed as a seizure, but as in Terry, it was a
seizure that was not, under the relevant facts and circumstances, unreasonable. Indeed, such action was perceived as
a necessary and proper police procedure. Hence, the majority
in Dunaway, after pointing out that such a detention was
in fact a seizure, went to great lengths to construe Terry
and its progeny as narrowly as possible. Reasonableness,
with the noted exceptions, was to be defined by the concept
of probable cause. If the cases are read in this light, Dunaway would be irrelevant to the disposition of Fitzgerald.
The decision, as the majority in Fitzgerald stated, turned
on the issue of voluntariness. If Fitzgerald acted voluntarily,
no arrest occurred; if his actions were involuntary, he had
been arrested. In the latter situation, Dunaway might have
been relevant, for the decision would preclude the State from
attempting to justify that seizure on the basis of a detention for investigation. That disagreement appears to be the
major point of contention between the majority and dissenting opinions in both cases."
Fitzgerald failed to answer, to Justice McClintock's
satisfaction, the question of how voluntariness should be
determined, and it is in this regard that the dissent scored
42. Supra, note 7.
43. See People v. Morales, People v. Dunaway, supra note 7. This author
believes the cases were decided on the rationale that, under the limited
exigent facts and circumstances of the cae, the "detention" (which would
be without doubt a seizure under Terry) was not unreasonable. People v.
Morales, supra note 9, at 58, 310, 902; "People v. Morales II" reaffirmed
"Morales I". Compare, People v. Dunaway, supra note 7, at 305, 494,
Denman, J., concurring. After stating the police conduct was reasonable,
citing "Morales II", Justice Denman stated that "Rights protected by the
Fourth Amendment are not violated until the conduct of the police becomes
unreasonable." Thus, the New York courts were attempting to justify the
decisions on a Terry analysis, although Terry v. Ohio, supra note 5, itself
was never cited. "Morales II" found that an alternative basis for the
decision existed in that an express finding was made by the trial court
that the defendant had consented to the police detention. The court of
appeals did, however, reaffirm its decision in "Morales I". People v.
Morales, supra note 7, at 138, 252, 592.
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some telling points. Justice McClintock suggested that the
matter should have been remanded to the trial court for
further determinations of fact on the specific issue of
whether Fitzgerald's actions were voluntary. Such an approach would seem reasonable and proper and would have
avoided the reliance by the majority opinion on inferences to
decide the case, particularly where other and contrary inferences were as reasonable as the ones made. Remand for
such determination is clearly within the power of an appellate court and, indeed, was the initial procedure adopted in
Dunaway and Morales to clarify similar issues. It seems
that because the question itself was one of fact, remand
should have occurred so that the matter could be resolved
by the trier of fact instead of by resort to what appeared to
be an implicit finding subsequently supported by inferences.
It appears that another important point over which
the majority and the dissent have split is on the duty of an
appellate court to review the record. Mr. Justice Rose, for
the majority in Fitzgerald,made several conclusions relating
to the resolution of the illegal arrest issue. He noted that
Fitzgerald did not testify at the suppression hearing; he
held that the issue of whether Fitzgerald went to the police
station voluntarily could be resolved by a preponderanceof-the-evidence standard, citing Lego v. Twomey," and
Lonquest v. State;4 and he stated that under the rules of
appellate review the court was required to view the evidence
most favorably to the party who prevailed below. He then
quoted from Repkie v. State :46
An appellate court, in assessing evidence as to its
sufficiency, is bound by the following rule:
'In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a verdict of guilty, an appellate court
will not weigh conflicting evidence nor consider the
credibility of witnesses; and it must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution
and determine questions of law as to whether there
44. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
45. 495 P.2d 575 (Wyo. 1972).
46. 583 P.2d 1272 (Wyo. 1978).
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is substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, or
both, which, with the reasonable inferences that may
be drawn therefrom, will sustain the verdict.'47
The majority then made an analysis of the facts and stated
its conclusion that Fitzgerald voluntarily accompanied the
police to the station house and found that the record supported the implicit finding of the trial court to that effect.
Mr. Justice McClintock took issue with such an approach
and stated that the matter should have been remanded for
a specific finding on the question. He also disagreed with
the conclusion that the issue could be resolved by a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard and that the basic rules
of appellate review cited by the majority applied. The dissent would have placed the burden to prove volition on the
State and would have required that such voluntary cooperation be proven by clear and positive evidence. In addition,
the State should have been required to establish the absence
of "duress or coercion, actual or implied." 48 Mr. Justice
McClintock could not agree that the appellate rule requiring
the court to view evidence favorable to the prevailing party
had any application in this case: "When an appellate court
is faced with a constitutional issue it is 'required to examine
the entire record and to make an independent, reflective
constitutional judgment on the facts.' "' The dissent, after
such a review, was unable to conclude, by clear and positive
evidence, that the consent was freely given.
Remand to the trial court for specific findings on the
fourth amendment issue would, as noted, appear to have
been the most reasoned resolution of the matter. The failure
to remand resulted in a contortion of appellate review
standards in constitutional matters in an effort to reach
a specific conclusion.
The argument is not persuasive that the trial court
implicitly found that the questioning was consensual and
that the actions of Fitzgerald were voluntary simply because
47. Fitzgerald v. State, supra note 2, at 1018.
48. Id. at 1025 (dissenting opinion), (quoting Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d
649, 650-51 (D.C.Cir. 1951).
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the court refused to grant a motion of the defense to suppress the statements made after Fitzgerald was at the
station house. The trial court made a determination regarding the voluntariness of the statements for fifth amendment purposes only. It could conceivably have found those
statements voluntary and admissible despite an illegal arrest
of Fitzgerald if, for example, it determined that Brown v.
Illinois would not have precluded their admission. Indeed,
a quick review of the facts indicate that Brown may well
have been applicable. In Brown, the question before the
Court was whether an inculpatory statement made after an
admittedly illegal arrest was admissible. The Court rejected
the argument that Miranda warnings in and of themselves
sufficiently dissipated the taint of the illegal arrest so as
to make the statements admissible. "The question whether
a confession is the product of a free will under Wong Sun
must be answered on the facts of each case." 5 The court
noted that several issues were to be evaluated, Miranda
warnings being "an important factor."'" In addition, the
proximity in time between the illegal arrest and the subsequent statements must be considered, as well as the
presence of other significant, although unspecifed, intervening circumstances, and, particularly, "the purpose and
flagrancy of the official misconduct." 2 Although reasonable
men might will disagree whether the trial court would have
acted properly in determining that, under the Brown
analysis, the statements made by Fitzgerald would be admissible even if the defendant had been illegally arrested,
such a determination, even if erroneous, is as plausible as
assuming the trial court must have found that the defendant
had not been arrested. It is clear that the only issue specifically decided was that the statements made should be
admitted into evidence.
It does appear, however, that the standard adopted by
the majority for determination of the question of whether
Fitzgerald voluntarily accompanied the police was proper,
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 1026 (dissenting opinion).
Brown v. Illinois, supra note 9, at 603.
Id.
Id. at 604.
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or at least not demonstrably incorrect. It certainly accords
with the rule of Lego v. Twomey." The issue of voluntariness, for purposes of the fourth amendment, is to be determined by the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. 4 Lego
and Dodge v. State,55 clearly adopted the preponderance-ofthe-evidence standard for determination of the voluntariness
of incriminating statements. A review of the cases indicates
no reason why that rule should not be applied to fourth
amendment issues, as well as the fifth amendment, as the
court did in Fitzgerald." Lego specifically noted that states
are allowed to adopt a higher or more stringent standard
for review of such issues, 7 and several states have apparently
adopted such an approach. 8 Lego, however, seems to provide sufficient authority and justification for adoption of
the preponderance standard. The court rejected the idea
that the exclusionary rule, a product of both the fourth and
fifth amendments, would require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt at a suppression hearing. There was no substantial
evidence that "federal rights have suffered from determining admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence....
[I]t is very doubtful that escalating the prosecution's burden of proof in Fourth and Fifth Amendment suppression
hearings would be sufficiently productive in this respect to
outweigh the public interest in placing probative evidence
before juries. ..."
Lego is broad enough to cover both the fifth and fourth
amendment issues, as United States v. Matlock shows."
Matlock involved a question of consent to search given by a
person other than the defendant. The Supreme Court, after
53. Supra, note 44.
54. Fitzgerald v. State, supra note 2, at 1018. See Dodge v. State, 562 P.2d 303
(Wyo. 1977); and Lego v. Twomey, supra note 44.
55. Supra, note 54.
56. See also, 3 LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 516 (1978).
57. Lego v. Twomey, supra note 44, at 489.
58. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal.3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971);
People v. Reynolds, 55 Cal. App.3d 357, 367, 127 Cal. Rptr. 561, 567 (1976)
(attempts by the government to justify a search on the basis of consent
must be proven by "clear and positive evidence that the consent was freely,
voluntarily and knowledgeably given."); State v. Amply, 259 La. 161, 249
So.2d 560, 566 (1971) ("clear and convincing").
59. Lego v. Twomey, supra,note 44, at 488-89.
60. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
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a review of the law relating to third party consent and the
evidence of the case, stated:
It appears to us, given the admissibility of Mrs.
Graff's and respondent's out-of-court statements,
that the Government sustained its burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that Mr.
Graff's voluntary consent to search the east bedroom was legally sufficient to warrant admitting
into evidence the $4,995 found in the diaper bag."1
(emphasis added)
Footnote 14 of the opinion then explained the factual background on the burden of proof issue, including an argument
that the district court and the court of appeals applied an
"unduly strict standard of proof." The court dismissed the
matter, but stated that "[i]n any event, the controlling
burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no
greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the
evidence." 2
The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard adopted by
the Fitzgerald majority was appropriate and was supported
by sufficient authority." In any event, the decision appears
to have settled the issue in Wyoming.
61. Id. at 177.
62. Lego v. Twomey, supra note 44; United States v. Matlock, supra note 60,
at 178.
63. See, however, 3 LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 498 et. seq., citing Bumper v.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968): "When a prosecutor seeks
to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the
burden of proving the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.
This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence
to a claim of lawful authority." If the analogy is valid between a search
and a seizure, would such a rule require a higher standard than the
preponderance of the evidence? The cases cited by the dissent in Fitzgerald
clearly seem to require more than proof by a preponderance of the evidence,
but all were decided prior to Lego (1972) and Matlock (1974). Perhaps
the argument should have focused on the authority of state courts to
afford greater protection under their constitutions than provided by federal
constitutional law. Lego clearly allows this and the Wyoming Supreme
Court has adopted this approach in an earlier decision, i.e., Clenin v. State,
573 P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1978).
This author does not believe Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938),
supports the argument of the dissent. Clearly, Johnson set standards for
waiver of constitutional rights, but interestingly enough, Johnson applied
the preponderance of the evidence standard to determine whether the
defendant had in fact intelligently and voluntarily waived his sixth
amendment right to counsel.
See generally, Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REv. 271, 296 (1975), who argues that in search
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Conversely, however, it also appears that both the Dodge
and Lego courts would have disapproved of the majority's
implicit finding that in Fitzgerald,the trial court must have
found that the defendant voluntarily accompanied the police
or it would have suppressed the subsequent statements. As
noted, such a holding ignored Brown v. Illinois. In both
Dodge and Lego, the courts expressly declared that it was
the prosecution's burden to establish that the statements
were voluntarily given. Dodge required that a separate
hearing be held, in accord with Jackson v. Denno,"4 and that
a "reliable determination on the issue of voluntariness" be
made by the court before the statement would be admissible2'
The conclusion of voluntariness "must appear from the
record with unmistaken clarity","8 and that decision must
be able to be ascertained from the record. 7 Dodge clearly
seems to require a specific finding by the trial court on the
issue of voluntariness and that such a finding should be
ascertainable from the record with unmistakable clarity.
It is difficult to conceive how an implicit finding would
satisfy that requirement, particularly when the burden is
on the State to prove the issue. Dodge, it is true, involved
the fifth amendment, but the analysis should be applicable
to fourth amendment issues as well.
Lego v. Twomey 8 also would support such an analysis.
In Lego, the court specifically stated the rule for determination of the admissibility of statements made by a
defendant and held that the issue of voluntariness can be
determined by the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
Nothing in the decision appears to require a different rule
for fourth amendment issues. The court, however, emphaand seizure cases the preponderance of the evidence standard is sufficient,
as evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment generally presents no problem of reliability, other rules exist to effectuate the policies
of the exclusionary rule and protection of privacy interests, and as it is
clear that such preliminary questions of fact are "unrelated to the merits
of the case." Fifth amendment issues, however, should, if anything, require
a higher standard of proof to ensure protection of the rights guaranteed
by the amendment.
64. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).

65. Dodge v. State, supra note 54, at 308.
66. Id. at 309.

67. Id. at 310.
68. Supra, note 44.
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sized that the defendant was entitled to a "reliable and
clear-cut determination" that his confession was indeed
voluntary, and that the prosecution must carry the burden
of proof on that issue.69 It would seem that such a rule
would contemplate, if not require, a specific determination
and finding by the trial court, or fact-finder, on the issue.
The remand of the cases in Morales, Brown and, initially,
in Dunaway, support that reading. Each case was remanded
with orders to the trial court to make more specific findings
on the issue of fact deemed necessary for the determination
0
of the case. As pointed out by the dissent in Fitzgerald,"
such would also have been appropriate in that case.
Finally, the traditional appellate rule requiring the
court to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prevailing party should have had no application to the
determination of the Fitzgerald case. It is important to keep
in mind that the issue to be resolved involved a question of
constitutional law-whether the defendant was illegally
seized in violation of the fourth amendment. The review
rule applied by the majority in Fitzgerald, and also in
McCutcheon v. State,7 had only been applied previously to
determine questions involving the sufficiency of the evidence
of each substantive element of a crime to sustain a conviction upon appeal; all the cases cited involved that question,
and not issues of constitutional law.
It would seem that the use of such a rule would be at
variance with the duty of an appellant court, as defined by
the United States Supreme Court, to "examine the entire
record and to make an independent, reflective constitutional
judgment on the facts."' 2 Although the Wyoming Supreme
69. Lego v. Twomey, supra note 44, at 489.
70. See, for example, Morales v. New York, supra note 8. The United States
Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion vacated the judgment below and
remanded the case for specific findings of fact by the trial level courts in
light of Brown v. Illinois, supra note 9. The court declined to decide the
case as the "record does not permit a satisfactory evaluation of the facts"
on the issues of Morales' apprehension. In the absence of a record that
"squarely and necessarily presents the issue and fully illuminates the
factual context in which the question arises", remand for further findings
was deemed appropriate. Morales v. New York, supra, at 105.
71. 604 P.2d 537 (Wyo. 1979).
72. Fitzgerald v. State, supra note 2, at 1026 (dissenting opinion).
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Court has not yet spoken on the issue, aside from Fitzgerald
and McCutcheon, the United States Supreme Court has
made its position on such matters clear:
It is our duty in this case, however, as in all of our
prior cases dealing with the question whether a
confession was involuntarily given, to examine the
entire record and to make an independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness."
The Fitzgerald majority espoused a rule of review that
would indeed examine the entire record, but which would
not require an "independent determination." To the contrary, the court, if it continues to apply this rule, will view
the evidence in a "light most favorable to the prosecution"
and determine whether there is substantial evidence, direct
or circumstantial, or both, which, together with all the
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence,
is sufficient to sustain the decision. 4 Obviously, the two
approaches are incompatible and this writer agrees with
Justice McClintock that such a rule has no place in the
determination of constitutional issues. The decision has the
effect of eliminating the court's ability to act as a guardian
and protector of constitutional rights, as it will require the
court to unduly defer to the determination below and, in
fact, will allow a shift of the burden of proof on the issue
to be decided on appeal. The duty to protect such fundamental
rights should not be allocated primarily to the trial bench,
and appellate courts should not so readily abdicate their
responsibilities.
THE LAW OF ARREST IN WYOMING AFTER
FITZGERALD AND DUNAWAY

It would appear after analysis of both decisions that
no major substantive change has been made in the law of
73. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741, 742 (1966). See also, Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) ; Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 566
(1970) (when a claim of violation of a constitutionally protected right is
involved, it is the duty of the court to make an independent examination
of the entire record).
74. Fitzgerald v. State, supra note 2, at 1018.
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arrest. An arrest can still properly be defined as any action
that deprives a person of his liberty by legal authority. It
would also seem apparent that voluntary cooperation with
the police will not constitute an arrest. As discussed above,
neither Fitzgerald nor Dunaway requires a different conclusion. In Dunaway, the concept of "detention for custodial
interrogation" was laid to rest once and for all. The Terry
"stop-and-frisk" rule, however, is still alive and well,
although narrowly construed, as would seem appropriate.
Several additional problems appear to have arisen, however,
that need resolution and the basic differences between the
majority and dissenting opinions in Fitzgerald emphasized
these problems.
It seems that the basic and initial problem is to define
and develop a method for determining whether a confrontation constitutes an unreasonable seizure for purposes of the
fourth amendment, or a voluntary colloquy. The question
becomes when and under what circumstances can we say
that a consensual or volitional act has occurred. For Justice
Rose, in Fitzgerald, and Justice Rehnquist, in Dunaway,
the issue was volition, and neither saw any problem with
such consensual or volitional conduct. Justice Brennan, in
the majority opinion in Dunaway, went to great lengths to
limit the opinion to involuntary conduct, which would not
preclude volitional cooperation. Justice McClintock, in his
dissent, seemed to raise the basic problems most clearlyhow can we be sure the defendant acted voluntarily? How
can we analyze and resolve the issue? And what is the role
of the appellate court in that determination? Interestingly,
but not surprisingly, all the Justices, Brennan, Rehnquist,
McClintock and Rose, disagreed in their opinions on the
issues being decided. Given the character of the issues involved and the questions raised, the burden placed on the
prosecution and the defense has grown heavy.
THE IMPLICATIONS

The decisions of Fitzgerald and McCutcheon v. State,
and to a certain extent, Dunaway, suggest several observahttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss2/7
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tions. First, it apparently will be the responsibility of the
defense to ensure that the record is specific and detailed on
the issues to be raised on appeal, for if evidence is weak,
or lacking, the court may well infer the existence of findings and facts sufficient to sustain a conviction.
Second, at any suppression hearing, it may be important to have the defendant testify on his perceptions of the
event with both the fourth and fifth amendment issues in
mind. It could be crucial, as all agree, to determine what
the defendant's perceptions of the event were-did he subjectively believe his liberty was restrained or that his actions
were involuntary." Such evidence would go a long way in
proving either consent or volition as opposed to an involuntary detention.7"
Third, counsel for the defense may be well advised to
specify in his motion each ground relied upon and to flesh
out the record at hearing on each point." Specific rulings
from the trial court on each issue appear desirable. The
analysis given in Brown provides a useful framework for
guidance when such issues arise. It would appear that many
of the issues involving the fourth amendment also involve
the fifth as in Fitzgerald and Dunaway, for the object of
75. Dangers are presented by having the defendant testify at the suppression
hearing. Although it would appear to be the rule that such evidence could
not be used at trial on the issue of guilt or innocence, it may be that the
testimony could be used for purposes of impeachment on a similar theory
as set forth in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See, People v.
Douglas, 66 Cal. App. 3d 998, 136 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1977) ; People v. Sturgis,
58 Ill. 2d 211, 317 N.E.2d 545 (1974) ; 3 LAFAvE, supra note 56 at 518, 519.
As LaFave notes, at 119: "Of course, a defendant who has testified at the
suppression hearing does not thereby waive his constitutional right to
decline to take the stand in his own defense at the trial. People v. Williams,
25 Ill.2d 562, 185 N.E.2d 686 (1962)."
76. Justices Rose and McClintock, in Fitzgerald, were concerned about the
subjective belief of the appellant. See 601 P.2d 1018 n.1, and 1023 n.5
(dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Stevens, concurring in Dunaway, supra
note 1, at 220, also indicated the same concern. Quaere the effect of
testimony by the defendant that he believed, for example, that he had been
arrested. It would appear, in such an event, the decision should turn on
the -existence of other objective evidence relating to the event, i.e., the
conduct of the police. What if the person seized was unreasonable in his
belief? How much weight should be given to such a belief and what standaxd should be used to evaluate it?
77. See generallyj 3 LAF-Av, supra note 56, at 498, which notes the dilemma
confronting a defense counsel-some degree of specificity may be required
at the risk of possible waiver of the issue on appeal. Yet, the more
specific the motion, the more the prosecution becomes educated to the
theories and factual basis of the defense.
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determining the legality of the arrest in a criminal case is
usually to obtain the protections of the exclusionary rule.
Brown, as noted, may help provide a method for that determination. A breakdown of the issues probably should include the following: (1) voluntariness of the statementsthe "threshold requirement." It appears clear, as noted above,
that the prosecution should bear the burden of proving
voluntariness by at least the preponderance of the evidence;
(2) whether proper Miranda warnings were given; (3) the
"temporal proximity" of the arrest and the making of the
statements; (4) the existence of relevant intervening circumstances; and (5) the purposefulness and flagrancy of
the police misconduct, if any.
Initially, of course, it should be determined if an
arrest occurred and if that arrest was legal. In the latter
event, Miranda will be the key to admissibility of any subsequent statements. 8 If the arrest was illegal, the Brown
analysis should be determinative.
There are, of course, dangers lurking in such an approach. It should be the prosecution's burden to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that, for example, a statement was voluntary, or that the conduct of the defendant
was volitional.' But, Fitzgerald, and perhaps McCutcheon,
present a dilemma to the defense. If defense counsel presents his case thoroughly, and loses, he will, without doubt,
reduce dramatically the possibility of prevailing on appeal.
If, however, he fails to present his case and adopts the stance
that the burden should be on the prosecution, he may well
find that if he loses the motion, on appeal findings may be
inferred and the record reviewed in a light most favorable
to the prosecution, granting all reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from that evidence. The defense will be required to tailor its approach with care on a case-by-case
basis, for resolution of the motion might well decide the
case.
78. See, Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483 (Wyo. 1975); Richmond v. State, 554
P.2d 1217 (Wyo. 1976).
79. Regarding the burden of proof, see generally 3 LAFAVE, supra note 56, at
498, for a discussion of the distinction between the "burden to produce
evidence" and the "burden of persuasion."
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CONCLUSION

In summary, it appears that neither Fitzgerald nor
Dunaway produced any noteworthy change in the substantive law of arrest as it existed in Wyoming. Dunaway merely
clarified, or sharpened, what many already considered to be
the law, and Fitzgerald, with the above noted exception,
produced no dramatic change. Fitzgerald's greatest impact,
however, will be procedural, as the case will affect pretrial
tactics and strategy, particularly for the defense bar. The
case could also have a negative effect on appellate review
of constitutional issues. The end result is that a greater
burden will be placed on the defense to present its case or
bear the risk that upon review, the Wyoming Supreme Court
will not independently seek to protect the constitutional
rights of defendants.
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